Abstract. A subsystem ofKripke-Platek set theory proof-theoretically equivalent to primitive recursive arithmetic is isolated; Aczel's (relative) consistency argument for the Anti-Foundation Axiom is adapted to a (related) weak setting; and the logical complexity of the largest bisimulation is investigated.
a. notion, in fact, that the problem becomes what notion of computation can be associated with these sets. The question of the computational character of AFA is of particular interest given its origins in the (corn putational) theory of transition systems (see chapter 8 of Aczel [4] ). In that work on Milner's SCCS as well as on transition systems given in Plotkin's SOS-style (Rutten [19] ), infinite sets are involved. Furthermore, if transition systems are to be related to first-order models (and some such steps are taken in Fernando [10, 11] ), then the question of identifying a weak set theory supporting both transition systems and first-order models arises.
In any case, the present author's interest in analyzing AFA lies largely in its relation to the notion of a bisimulation -a notion fundamental to semantic attempts at explicating the dynamic nature of information. For such semantic investigations, it is natural to appeal not only to the ordinary notions of computability and decidability familiar to computer scientists, but also to subtle, set-theoretic notions. 5 Now, a logical analysis of AFA might proceed in various ways. Lindstrom [15) formalizes L. Hallnas' conception of non-well-founded sets in Martin-Lo£ type theory, building on a constructive version of ZF given in Aczel [3] , that, as it turns out, is equivalent to ZF over classical logic. This equivalence blocks a direct understanding in terms of proof-theoretic measures (that at present fall far short of ZF). And from a classical model-theoretic point of view, it would be natural to replace ZFC by a theory, say KP, with many interesting models, and investigate the question mark?
in the diagram Con(ZFC-) ==*' Con(ZFC-+ AFA)
.!J.
.!).
Oon(KP-) k Con(KP-+ AFA)
where Con is a consistency statement formulated in terms of models. It bears repeating that the theory KP-in the diagram might be enriched, so long as the models of interest are not ruled out. As will become clear below, the issue here is not the consistency of AFA, but its computational requirements. And these requirements are most clearly exposed in a theory more (directly) sensitive to constructive principles than ZFC-. This is not to say that ZFC-is devoid of any intuitions about construction. The "limitations of size" principle behind the set-class distinction has been so widely accepted and developed that it is perhaps not terribly appropriate to apply the label "set theory" to a theory supporting the existence of a universal set. And there are sound foundational reasons to look at finer questions of size (through a theory of "counting") given that the object w = {O, 1, ... } is infinitely more interesting (and complicated) than [2 = {J2}. A comparison of these two sets suggests that some care must be exercised in pushing the intuition that a non-well-founded set is a limit of well-founded sets, particularly when it leads to a universal set (as is the case in Abramsky [1]).
The approach taken below is to carry out Aczel's relative consistency argument for AFA in a weak setting connected with a view of mathematics that, although called finitist, can nonetheless support infinite objects. The reader is referred to Feferman (9] for background on proof-theoretic and foundational reductions related to consistency arguments. For orientation, it is useful to note that the system PRA of primitive recursive arithmetic is commonly associated with finitism, and (reminiscent of KP's suitability for countable syntactic notions) is adequate for formulating elementary syntactic notions (involved, for example, in Godel's incompleteness theorems). Briefly then, the next section describes a subsystem KP1 of KP proof-theoretically equivalent to PRA (building on the correspondence between hereditarily finite sets and natural numbers, the theory of primitive recursive set functions in Jensen and Karp (14] , and the reduction in Parsons (17] of sr-IA to PRA). (The point here is that quantifier complexity for set theory is related but not identical to that for number theory.) Section 3 carries out Aczel's construction of a model of AFA in a primitive recursive framework provided by explicit mathematics (Feferman [8] ) where a model of KP1 can be defined. Complications arising from the problem of preserving restricted schemes of comprehension and collection motivate the discussion in section 4 of computational "counting" principles for the largest bisimulation. dn := {di I ith bit of n is 1} .
Note that E (on HF) is a primitive recursive predicate
and accordingly is defined by te[m, n] = 0 for some primitive recursive term te(x,y) in the language .C(PRA) of PRA. Now, we can describe an interpretation-* of .C(E) in .C(PRA) by passing syntactically from x E y to te(x, y) = 0, and semantically from an .C(PRA)-structure M = (M, ... ) to an .C( E)-structure M* = (M, E) where Going the other direction, we have an interpretation -0 of .C( P RA) in .C( E) by the usual identification of natural numbers with finite ordinals. Note that the predicate w(x) in .C(E) is Llo. Furthermore, the (numerical) primitive recursive functions can be extracted as restrictions to w of primitive recursive set functions, to which we now turn.
The primitive recursive set functions are given in Jensen and Karp [14] as follows. Close the initial functions under substitution
and recursion 
11E11
Let P RS be the (classical) first-order theory in the language of set theory consisting of the axioms of extensionality, pairing, union, Llo-separation, induction on primitive recursive formulas cp Under suitable arithmetization, the collections of proofs in PRA and PRS are primitive recursive. Furthermore, a primitive recursive function can be constructed mapping (provably in PRA) axioms <p of PRS to PRA-proofs of <p*. Consequently,
The converse of Proposition 1 fails because the sets that P RA -*-induces are "finite."
(For a counter-example, take the .C( E)-sentence that asserts that every non-empty a set has an E-maximal element 3x E a x E a :::
its -*-translation is a theorem of PRA.) We can, however, approximate a converse. As e 0 is a primitive recursive formula for every .C(PRA)-equation e, another inductive argument on the the length of a proof yields Mention of primitive recursive formulas can be avoided altogether by asserting the principle of induction for all E 1-formulas. Set PRS 1 to PRS with primitive recursive induction promoted to E1-induction (E11A). Now, the -*-translated content of the E1 -recursion rule does not change since Parsons [17] proved (in PRA) that if
where R is primitive recursive, then
for some primitive recursive function /. The arguments for PRS and PRA adapt readily to yield
As with Proposition 1, the converse to part 1 of Proposition 4 fails, which leads us to formulate Concerning point (b ), it is interesting to note that PRS' is a subsystem of the predicative set theories in Feferman [7] , and hence does not imply Llo-collection: 
8 The E 1 -recursion rule is a consequence (relative to KP-) of ( E1 +JI i)IA. If the existence of the transitive closure of a set is added to KP-(as in work by Jager), then .II1IA is not necessary to justify the rule, although JI11A is useful for purposes other than proving the existence of transitive closures (see Barwise [5] ), an example of which is given in section 4 below. The author does not see how to derive II1IA from E1IA (in particular, how to adapt the argument in Sieg (21] reducing JI~-IA to E~-IA).
setting than ZFC-. Accordingly, over a model (S, :=:::!, E) of KP-(i.e., KP minus foundation), define the following.
-A graph G is a pair (Na, ~a) with -+o s;; Na x Na.
-The Anti-Foundation Axiom, AFA, is the assertion that every graph has a unique decoration. -A pointed graph (pg) is a pair (G, a) consisting of a graph G and a set a E Na. 9 -A bisimulation between graphs G and G 1 is a set R such that whenever bRb', -Let The preceding definitions all refer to sets (i.e., objects in S), except for the collections Bis, So and ::::!o. These collections will serve as useful abbreviations, but where do they live? Rather than working in a framework where "limitations of size" lead, for example, to complications with quotients 10 , it is possible instead to work in the framework of explicit mathematics (Feferman (8] ), where
(1) theories of weak proof-theoretic strength can be formulated naturally, and (2) the problem of quotients can be sidestepped by adopting Bishop's use of "equality" relations.
Concerning point (1), observe that a model of KP1 can be defined (by numerically coding the hereditarily finite sets) in the theory APP+ ECA + Obj-indN described in Jager [13] (where it is stated, furthermore, to be proof-theoretically equivalent to PRA). As for point (2), this was anticipated above in isolating the interpretation :=:::! of equality on S. To go along with ~o, define the subclass Eo of So x So as follows Proof. First, observe that ECA supports the (class) definitions of S 0 , :::::: 0 , and Eo from S, :=:::!, and E above since the only terms that occur qua class in the defining formulas are S, ::::J, and E. Second, to see that ~o is an equivalence relation is routine (assuming KP-): clearly, ~o is reflexive (since for every pg (G, a) , the restriction of~ to NG is a bisimulation on G), symmetric (since if Risa bisimulation between G and G', then R-1 is a bisimulation between G' and G), and transitive (since if Risa bisimulation between G and G', and R' is a bisimulation between G' and G 11 , then R a R' is a bisimulation between G and G"). Third, although a quotient need not be formed, it is necessary to prove that Eo respects ::::Jo. So suppose ( G, a), ( G', a' ), ( G 1, a1) and This is a consequence of three facts: (1) ::::Jo is an equality for {So, ~o, Eo), (2) for every pg (G, a), and every x Eo (G, a), there is a y E [(G, a)) 0 where x ~o y, and (3) for every pg (G,a), every x E [(G,a)) 0 is Eo (G,a) . Now, to establish the analog to Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.7 in Aczel [4] (implying the system V,, constructed there is full), define the predicate 
Copy(G,a,A) ~ \:/(G',a')
E So (G 1 ,a') Eo (G,a) = 3(G~,{(a,a1)} U {(b,b1) E No x Na 1 I 3( G', a') E A t/l( G, b, G', a') A t/J( G 1, b1, G', a')
Vb+-o a 3(G',a') EA Bis(R,G,b,G',a') /I. V(G',a') EA 3b +-o a Bis(R,G,b,G',a')
and an R1 satisfying applying Lemma 8 to {BE So I [7,b] 0 }, then it follows that for every x Eo Na,
whence (by Extensionality), 
Infinity: given an a E S that makes Infinity true (i.e., "a = w") in (S, :::::!, E), apply Lemma 8 to the set A obtained by applying £'-collection to 'efn E a 3b P( n, b) where
Power: given (G,a) E So, apply Lemma 8 to a set A such that
(again obtained by E-collection, noting that Copy can be put in E-form 13 ).
Choice: choice functions can be produced in 80 (assuming such exist in S) as in the proof of Rieger's theorem in Aczel [4] . where a E Na and a 1 E Ne, can be taken to be a subset of Ne x Na,, the problem is overcome by assuming Power. 14 Corollary 9. If S, ~ and E are (APP+ ECA)-classes such that (S, ~, E) f= KP-+ Power then the classes So, ~o and Eo in Theorem 7 form a model of KP-+Power+ AFA.
As already mentioned, the theory T :=APP+ ECA + Obj-indN of explicit mathematics is proof-theoretically equivalent to PRA, according to Jager [13] . Within T, classes S, ~, E can be defined (as in the previous section) such that (S, ~, E) f= KP1 + Power 13 That is, Copy ( G, a, x) can be re-expressed as a' ) Eo (G,a).
14 As Prof. Barwise has pointed out to the author, the notation KP-+ Power might be interpreted as requiring that the powerset predicate is taken to be .<10 . This is not necessary, because all possible bisimulations referred to in [-Jo-translating a .<10 -formula can be found in a set constructed from (the interpretations of) its free variables (since all quantifiers are bounded).
(where, by Lemma 5, KP1 +Power= PRA). Combined with Corollary 9, this provides an illustration of the finitary character of AFA. From the point of view of admissible sets (and more generally, computational theories based on enumeration), however, Power is an undesirable axiom that is best avoided (or at least weakened to Power or Infinity), and its use for capturing the largest bisimulation suggests a certain impredicativity about AFA somewhat at odds with the claim that the axiom is finitistic. The question arises as to whether the existence of a bisimulation can be expressed by a Ll-predicate over a finitist (i.e., at most primitive recursive) subsystem of KP. A natural attempt at answering this question affirmatively would involve some principle of induction. 15 
Induction and the largest bisimulation
In practice, a good deal of the proof-theoretic strength of a set theory lies in its induction principles. Over a universe of possibly non-well-founded sets, however, such principles must be formulated carefully (given the difficulty in applying these globally). The approach taken below is to introduce a unary relation symbol Ord plus suitable axioms, and to relativize the induction principles to Ord. More precisely, let KPOrd be KP plus
(Note that this is a conservative extension of KP since, under foundation, Ord (x) can be given a Ll0-definition, as in Barwise [5] .) Now, let KPf>rd be the result of z, x, w, y) ) is the defining formula for the function derived by recursion from a E 1-formula 7/i(z, x, w, y) (see section 2). This rule provides a constructive (i.e., ordinal) approach to the least and greatest fixed points of certain inductive definitions. 16 15 A negative answer for a particular subsystem T might proceed by choosing an appropriate model of T, with respect to which a. ..1-definition of the largest bisimulation would lead to a contradiction. The interest in such a result would depend largely on the interest in the model used. The author has tried and failed to push through such an argument for L(wfK). 16 The reader is referred to Aczel [2] for far more background than is presently required. Implicit here is the assumption that 3/3 E a n(/3, -) defines a set (i.e., {a I 3/3 E a <pr(f3, a)}), as does, for o: > 0, V,8 E a C/'J(/3, -). The idea is to characterize the least fixed point I 'I' and the greatest fixed point J 'I' of cp( R, x) by
(1) (2) Typically, -<:=: of (1) and :::;.. of (2) are justified by induction principles, while the converses rest on a cardinality argument -i.e., a well-ordering principle that enables induction to be enforced globally (on all sets). But, how are the left hand sides defined in the first place? If we agree that
not only fails to lower the complexity of J'l'(x) given by (1), but is, in fact, incorrect, since the variable R must range over classes (including proper ones for choices of cp(R, x) such as x = x). As for the corresponding definition above of Jip(x), the point is that the argument R in <p( R, y) must be a set, which in the terminology of Aczel (4] induces a "set continuous" class operator
We now apply these ideas to a concrete case. N, _,),a, (N', -' ),a')=: v 0 rda 'f!J(a, a, a'; N, _., N', ->') , (3) where recall from section 2 that Bis ( R, G, a, G', a' ) says that R is a bisimulation between G and G' relating a to a'. ( =>) follows from I/ 1 IA, even if relativized to Ord, applied to the slightly modified assertion: for all graphs (N, _,) and (N', -> 1 is a bisimulation between (N,->) and (N', -> 1 ), and, assuming the right hand side of (3) holds, aRa'. Note that 7/;* (where-* is the translation from the language of set theory to the language of arithmetic given in section 2) is provable in E?-IA, the point being that, under -*, the "closure ordinal" & can be computed primitive recursively from (N, _,) and (N', -'). By Lemma 5 and the preceding discussion of We leave to the interested reader the question of whether KPfrd +'If; is contained in a theory T proof-theoretically equivalent to PRA, lying between KP-and KP (plus, if necessary, a global well-ordering principle), for which the passage from S, ~, E to So, ~o, Eo in the previous section sends models of T to models of T +A FA. The author suggests taking T to be KPfrrl, although he has (alas) been unable to determine whether or not this works.
